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Abstract 
Application of the MIT Emissions Prediction and Policy Analysis (EPPA) model to assessment of the future 
of coal under climate policy revealed the need for an improved representation of load dispatch in the 
representation of the electric sector. A new dispatching algorithm is described and the revised model is 
applied to an analysis of the future of coal use to 2050 and 2100 under alternative assumptions about CO2 
prices, nuclear expansion and prices of natural gas. Particular attention is devoted to the potential role of 
coal-electric generation with CO2 capture and storage. An appendix provides a comparison of a subset of 
these results with and without the more detailed model of electric dispatch. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 As an input to the MIT study of The Future of Coal (Ansolabehere et al., 2007) the MIT 
Emissions Projection and Policy Analysis (EPPA) model was applied to an assessment of the 
fate of the coal industry under various scenarios of greenhouse gas mitigation and alternative 
assumptions about nuclear power growth and the future price of natural gas. A main determinant 
of the future of coal is the crucial role in climate policy of the application of carbon capture and 
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storage (CCS) to coal-electric generation. Absent emissions controls, coal is the lowest-cost 
fossil source for base-load electric generation. Also, coal resources are widely distributed among 
developed and developing countries, raising fewer security concerns than do oil and natural gas. 
These advantages, combined with regional interests tied to coal, make it highly unlikely that this 
fuel can be substantially removed from electric generation, so success in developing and 
implementing CCS technology is a priority objective in the management of climate risk. 
In early applications of the EPPA model to studies of CCS a shortcoming became evident in 
the way electric generation was handled. For analysis of the aggregate performance of the 
electric sector and its emissions a simplified representation electric load dispatch (i.e. the 
allocation of different forms of generation to meet the electric load curve) was satisfactory. With 
a focus on specific technologies like CCS, however, a breakdown of electric demand among 
base, intermediate and peak load service proved necessary.  
The paper is organized in the following way. In Section 2 we discuss the method applied to 
represent load dispatch in the electric sector of this model. Section 3 presents several scenarios of 
coal use developed for The Future of Coal study but expanding the national coverage beyond the 
U.S. and China to include a wider group of countries. Section 4 focuses on the role of CCS 
technologies. We explore an expansion of the time horizon to 2100 also in Section 5 and Section 
6 concludes. The effects of the different formulations on projected energy use, CO2 emissions, 
and CCS use are explored in the Appendix. 
2. THE MIT EPPA MODEL 
2.1 Model Structure 
In this analysis we apply the Emissions Prediction and Policy Analysis (EPPA) model, which 
is a multi-regional general equilibrium (CGE) model of the world economy (Paltsev et al., 2005). 
It is built on the economic and energy data from the GTAP dataset (Dimaranan and McDougall, 
2002; Hertel, 1997), additional energy data from IEA (2005), and additional data for non-CO2 
greenhouse gases and other and urban gas emissions. The model version applied here 
distinguishes sixteen countries or aggregate regions, six non-energy sectors, fifteen energy 
extraction and conversion sectors and specific technologies, and includes a representation of 
household consumption behavior, as presented in Table 1. The model is solved on a five-year 
time step to 2100, the first calculated year being 2005. Elements of EPPA model relevant to this 
application include its equilibrium structure, its characterization of production sectors, the 
handling of international trade, the structure of household consumption, and drivers of the 
dynamic evolution of the model including the characterization of advanced or alternative 
technologies, importantly carbon capture and storage (CCS).  
The virtue of models of this type is that they can be used to study how world energy markets 
would adapt to a policy change such as the adoption of a carbon emission tax, the establishment 
of cap-and-trade systems, or implementation of various forms of direct regulation of emissions. 
For example, a carbon tax or cap-and-trade system would increase the consumer prices of fossil 
fuels, stimulating changes in consumer behavior and in the sectoral composition of production, 
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causing a shift to low-carbon energy resources, and encouraging investment in more efficient 
energy use. A model like EPPA gives a consistent picture of the future energy market that 
reflects these dynamics of supply and demand as well as the effects of international trade. Its 
projections are, of course, dependent on its particular structure and the parameter estimates 
included so its value is in the insights to be gained from system behavior, not the details of 
particular numerical results. 
 
Table 1. Regions and Sectors in the EPPA4 Model. 
________________________________________________________ 
Country/Region    Sectors 
 
Annex B     Non-Energy 
United States (USA)     Agriculture (AGRI)  
Canada (CAN)    Services (SERV) 
Japan (JPN)     Energy Intensive products (EINT) 
European Union+a (EUR)   Other Industries products (OTHR) 
Australia/New Zealand (ANZ)  Industrial Transportation (TRAN) 
Former Soviet Union (FSU)   Household Transportation (HTRN) 
Eastern Europeb (EET)   Energy 
Non-Annex B     Coal (COAL) 
India (IND)     Crude Oil (OIL) 
China (CHN)      Refined Oil (ROIL)  
Indonesia (IDZ)    Natural Gas (GAS) 
Higher Income East Asiac (ASI)  Electric: Fossil (ELEC) 
Mexico (MEX)     Electric: Hydro (HYDR) 
Central and South America (LAM)  Electric: Nuclear (NUCL) 
Middle East (MES)    Advanced Energy Technologies 
Africa (AFR)     Electric: Simple Cycle Gas Turbine (GT) 
Rest of Worldd (ROW)   Electric: Natural Gas Combined Cycle (Adv. Gas) 
Electric: Gas Capture and Storage (Gas + CCS) 
Electric: Supercritical Pulverized Coal (Adv. Coal) 
Electric: Coal Capture and Storage (Coal + CCS) 
      Electric: Wind and Solar (SOLW)    
Liquid fuel from biomass (BOIL) 
Oil from Shale (SYNO) 
      Synthetic Gas from Coal (SYNG)  
                                                                                                   
aThe European Union (EU-15) plus countries of the European Free Trade Area (Norway, Switzerland, 
Iceland). 
bHungary, Poland, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia. 
cSouth Korea, Malaysia, Phillipines, Singapore, Taiwan, Thailand 
dAll countries not included elsewhere: Turkey, and mostly Asian countries. 
2.2 Modification of the EPPA Load Dispatching Algorithm 
For the purpose of this analysis of coal and the role of CCS, three modifications are made to 
the representation of new technologies in EPPA’s electric power sector.   
• The production structure of electricity from new dispatchable technologies is modified to 
include base load, intermediate load, and peak load generation,   
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• New fossil-based electricity generating technologies, such as supercritical pulverized coal 
and simple cycle gas turbine, are introduced, and   
• The bottom-up economic data of all new fossil generating technologies are updated. 
These modifications are discussed in detail below. 
Electricity demand varies over hours, days and months due to high demand periods during 
the day and low at night, the workweek vs. weekend, and seasonal light and temperature 
differences. These intra-annual changes in demand influence the mix of technologies and fuels 
needed to instantaneously balance supply and demand on the power grid. To account for these 
changes we introduce base load, intermediate load and peak load to the production structure for 
electricity from new dispatchable generation technologies.1 The combined supply from these 
different service levels is modeled as a perfect substitute for electricity generated using extant 
(conventional) technologies which are not distinguished by position on the load curve. The sector 
structure is shown in Figure 1 which details the factor inputs to these generation sources.2 
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Figure 1. Nesting structure of dispatchable electricity in EPPA. 
 
The electric output for each load category may be supplied by one or more technologies as 
shown in Figure 2. For each of these dispatchable technologies there is a further nesting of 
inputs as detailed in Panel d of Figure 6 in Paltsev et al. (2005).  Peak generation technology is 
based upon a simple-cycle natural gas turbine with low capital costs.  Intermediate and base 
generation may be provided by advanced gas and advanced coal with or without carbon capture 
                                                 
1 There are other examples of top-down models with electric dispatch. For example, Sands (2004) introduces peak 
and base load generation into a top-down model, but without intermediate load and with fewer technologies. 
2 The growth of nuclear power is assumed here to be largely exogenous (see Table 4). 
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and storage.  The advanced gas technology is modeled after a natural gas combined cycle plant 
(see McFarland et al., 2004).  The advanced coal technology is based upon a supercritical 
pulverized coal plant.  Advanced gas and coal with capture and storage are based upon post-
combustion capture for gas and pre-combustion capture technologies for coal.3  
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Figure 2. Technology options for peak, intermediate and base load generation 
(technologies added in EPPA version 4 in italics).  
 
Intra-annual demand variation for the extant technologies (conventional fossil, nuclear, and 
hydro) is already accounted for in the base-year data.  Non-dispatchable generation (e.g., wind 
and solar), by definition, is not load following and is treated as an imperfect substitute for 
dispatchable generation (see Paltsev et al., 2005). As the simulation proceeds, older vintages of 
conventional generation (without the dispatching detail) are retired from use, and because of 
their improved characteristics the electric service progressively shifts to the new dispatchable 
sources. 
To estimate the share of electricity assigned to each load category, we use the annual 
distribution of demand for the U.S. as shown in the load duration curve in Figure 3, plotted from 
highest load to lowest load (Hadley and Hirst, 1998).  Although base load, intermediate load, and 
peak load demand are common terms in the electric power literature, there are no precise 
definitions.  In this analysis, peak load is defined as the demand for capacity that has to be met in 
the highest 1200 hours per year (3.3 hours per day) out of the total 8760 hours in a year. This 
load is 441 GW in the calculations below and this peak service accounts for 2% of energy 
demand (area ABC in Figure 3).  Intermediate load is defined as the MW output in the top 5000 
hours per year (10.4 hours per day) less the peak demand, or 370 GW, a level that comprises 6% 
of energy demand (BCDE in the figure).  The remainder of the generation requirement is 
classified as base load and accounts for 92% of annual demand (the area under the curve DEF).  
The EPPA model variables are in value terms, so the shares of base, intermediate, and peak 
                                                 
3 The expected cost differences between an integrated combined cycle plant with pre-combustion capture and an 
oxyfuel plant with post-combustion capture are within the range of uncertainty for each technology.  Because 
these technologies are not treated separately, the model results apply to either technology or a mix. 
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generation required to produce a perfect substitute for generation from the extant technologies 
are based upon the revenue stream of each category of generation, not the share of electricity in 
physical units.  Peak and intermediate electricity are more expensive than base generation 
because capital is amortized over fewer hours and more start-up and shut-down costs are 
incurred.  We derive the value share for each category by running the Oak Ridge National 
Laboratory’s ORCED model (Hadley and Hirst, 1998) for the U.S.  The shares of revenue by 
load category are 3% peak, 14% intermediate, and 83% base.  Currently, no substitution is 
permitted in the model between the three categories.  Lacking region-specific data on hourly 
demand and prices, we apply the U.S. data to all EPPA regions in the results shown in Section 3.  
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Figure 3. Annual load duration curve for the U.S. 
The Appendix explores the implications of alternative patterns of this load-duration 
relationship. There it is shown that the introduction of load dispatching has a significant effect on 
several important model outputs when compared to the same model without load segments for 
peak and intermediate load. Different levels of peaking demand are explored under a “High CO2 
price” scenario as described below. With load dispatch coal consumption declines by 5% to 11% 
in 2050 without a carbon policy (Business-As-Usual or BAU) but rises by 1% to 2% with a 
sample emissions control policy. Global CO2 emissions decline by 3% to 5% without policy and 
by 4% to 8% with a policy.  This difference in emission reduction and coal consumption 
suggests that CCS plays a more prominent role when electricity dispatch is modeled explicitly.  
Globally, generation from coal with CCS rises by 9% to 20% with load dispatch while total 
electricity demand falls by 3% to 9% in the no-policy cases and between 2% and 4% under the 
high CO2 prices. 
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The bottom-up cost information for generation technologies is presented in Table 2 (non-
capture technologies) and Table 3 (capture technologies).  Capital cost, heat rate, and operation 
and maintenance costs are taken from various sources (Ansolabehere et al., 2007; Parsons, 2002; 
U.S. DOE, 2004; U.S. EPA, 2005).  The capacity factors for peak (13%), intermediate (54%), 
and base (85%) generation are a product of the percentage of hours in a year for the particular 
load segment and plant availability.  The reference energy prices for coal and gas are assumed to 
be $1.44/MMBtu and $5.00/MMBtu respectively.  We assume a cost of 2.43 cents/kWh for 
electricity transmission and distribution and $10/tCO2 for the cost of CO2 transport and storage 
(McFarland et al., 2004). 
 
Table 2. Cost data for gas turbine, advanced gas, and advanced coal technologies. 
Technology GTa Advanced Gasb Advanced Coalc 
Load Segment Peak Shoulder Base Shoulder Base 
Capacity Factor 14% 54% 85% 54% 85% 
Capital ($/kW) 460 510 510 1330 1330 
Heat Rate (Btu/kWh) 8550 6138 6138 8709 8709 
Cost of Electricity (cents/kWh) 
Capital 5.75 1.61 1.03 4.20 2.68 
O&M 0.33 0.25 0.25 0.75 0.75 
Fuel 4.28 3.07 3.07 1.26 1.26 
Trans. & Dis. 2.40 2.40 2.40 2.40 2.40 
Totald 12.8 7.36 6.78 8.64 7.12 
Mark-up 1.79 1.03 0.95 1.21 1.00 
a. Capital cost, operations and maintenance, and heat rate are from EPA (2005) and DOE (2004). 
b. Capital cost, operations and maintenance, and heat rate from Parsons (2002). 
c. Capital cost, operations and maintenance, and heat rate from Ansolabehere et al. (2007). 
d. Total and sum of cost of electricity may not be equal due to rounding. 
The cost of electricity for each type of generation is calculated using the methodology 
outlined by David (2000).  Plant capital costs are annualized using a 15% capital charge rate.  
The factor shares of capital, labor, and fuel are computed as shares of the total cost of electricity 
using the methodology described in McFarland et al. (2004).  The nesting structure for the 
technology production functions and corresponding elasticities may be found in Paltsev et al. 
(2005).  The mark-up for each technology is calculated as the ratio of its cost of electricity to the 
cost of base load pulverized coal.  Additionally, the gradual penetration rates for newer 
technologies (i.e. advanced gas, advanced gas with CCS, and advanced coal with CCS) are 
implemented using a technology- and region-specific fixed factor that grows endogenously based 
on the previous period’s output, as described by Paltsev et al. (2005).  
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Table 3. Cost data for advanced gas with capture and advanced coal with capture.a  
Technology Advanced Gas + Captureb Advanced Coal + Capturec 
Load Segment Shoulder Base Shoulder Base 
Capacity Factor 54% 85% 54% 85% 
Capital 1084 1084 1893 1893 
Heat Rate 6991 6991 10223 10223 
Cost of Electricity (cents/kWh) 
Capital 2.86 1.82 5.98 3.81 
O&M 0.75 0.75 1.02 1.02 
Fuel 3.50 3.50 1.48 1.48 
Trans. & Dis. 2.40 2.40 2.40 2.40 
CO2 Trans. & Stor. 0.19 0.19 0.43 0.43 
Totald 9.72 8.69 11.33 9.17 
Mark-up 1.36 1.22 1.59 1.28 
a. The bottom-up cost data used in this analysis are higher than that used in Paltsev et al. (2005). 
b. Capital cost, operations and maintenance, and heat rate from Parsons (2002). 
c. Capital cost, operations and maintenance, and heat rate from Ansolabehere et al. (2007) 
d. Total and sum of cost of electricity may not be equal due to rounding. 
3. SCENARIOS OF COAL FUTURES 
3.1 Cases for Analysis 
To explore the potential effects of carbon policy we employ the three cases used in The 
Future of Coal: a reference or “Business-as-usual” (BAU) case with no emissions policy beyond 
the first Kyoto period, and two cases involving the imposition of a common global price on CO2 
emissions. The two policy cases, “Low CO2 price” and “High CO2 price”, are shown in Figure 
4, with the CO2 penalty stated in terms of 2005 $US per ton of CO2. This penalty or emissions 
price can be thought of as the result of a global cap-and-trade regime, a system of harmonized 
carbon taxes, or even a combination of price and regulatory measures that combine to impose 
equal marginal penalties on emissions. Throughout the analysis universal participation in 
assumed: i.e. the same emissions price applies to all nations. The “Low CO2 price” profile 
corresponds to a proposal of the National Commission on Energy Policy, which we represent by 
applying its maximum or “safety valve” cap-and-trade price (NCEP, 2004). It involves a penalty 
that begins in 2010 with $8 per ton CO2 and increases at a rate of 5% per year thereafter. The 
“High CO2 price” case assumes the imposition of a larger initial charge of $30 per ton CO2 in the 
year 2015 with a rate of increase of 4% thereafter.4  One important difference to be explored in 
the comparison of these two cases is the time when CSS technology may take a substantial role 
as an emissions reducing measure. 
                                                 
4 The carbon prices are converted from 1997 dollars used by Ansolabehere et al. (2007) to 2005 dollars using chain-
weighted dollars from the Bureau of Economic Analysis’s National Income and Product Accounts. 
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Figure 4. Scenarios of Penalties on CO2 Emissions ($/t CO2). 
A second influence on the role of coal in future energy use is competition from nuclear 
generation, and again two cases from the MIT The Future of Coal study are considered, shown in 
Table 4. In a “Limited nuclear” case, it is assumed that nuclear generation, from its year 1997 
level in the EPPA database of 2.39 million GWh, is held to 2.43 million GWh in 2050.  The 
alternative case, denoted as “Expanded nuclear”, assumes that nuclear capacity grows by 
roughly a factor of three and generation reaches 7.4 million GWh over this period—a level 
estimated as possible in The Future of Nuclear Power (Ansolabehere et al., 2003) if certain cost, 
waste and proliferation concerns can be met.  
Table 4. Alternative Cases for Nuclear Generation (Million GWh/year). 
2050b Region 1997a 
Limited Expanded 
USA 0.67 0.58 2.23 
Europe 0.92 0.94 1.24 
Japan 0.32 0.42 0.48 
Other OECD 0.17 0.10 0.34 
FSU & EET 0.23 0.21 0.41 
China 0.01 0.00 0.75 
India 0.01 0.00 0.67 
Other Asia 0.04 0.19 0.57 
Rest of World 0.02 0.00 0.74 
TOTAL 2.39 2.43 7.44 
a. IEA (2007). 
b. Scenarios from Ansolabehere et al. (2007). 
The third sensitivity test below explores the evolution of natural gas prices. The EPPA model 
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includes a sub-model of resources and depletion of fossil fuels including natural gas, and one 
scenario, denoted “EPPA-Ref gas price”, is the model’s own projection of gas prices (which 
differ by model region) under the supply and demand conditions in the various simulations. In 
the “Business-as-usual” case with “Limited nuclear” generation, the U.S. gas price is projected 
to rise by 2050 by a factor of 3.6 over the base year price, which implies a price of around $10 
per million cubic feet (Mcf) in 2050 in 2005 dollars. To test the effect of substantial new 
discovery and development of low-cost LNG transport systems, a “Low gas price” case is 
explored. In this case the EPPA gas transport sub-model is overridden by a low-cost global 
transport system which leads to lower prices in key heavy gas-consuming regions. For example, 
with the “Low gas price” scenario the 2050 price multiple for the U.S. is only 2.4 over the base 
year or a price of $6.60/Mcf in 2005 dollars.  
3.2 Coal Use Assuming CCS Is Available 
In order to display the relationships that underlie the future evolution of coal use we impose a 
policy scenario where CCS is available on an economic basis and all nations adopt, by one 
means or another, the carbon emissions penalties as shown in Figure 4. In the EPPA model 
projections such emissions penalties would be sufficient to stabilize global CO2 emissions in the 
period to 2050. This result is shown in Figure 5 on the assumption of “Limited nuclear” 
generation, and “EPPA-Ref gas prices”. With no climate policy, global energy-related emissions 
are projected to rise to 70 GtCO2 per year by 2050. Under the “High CO2 price” scenario, by 
contrast, global emissions are stabilized by around 2025 at level of about 30 GtCO2. If only the 
“Low CO2 price” path is imposed, emissions would not stabilize until around 2045 at a level of 
approximately 44 GtCO2 per year.  
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Figure 5. Global CO2 emissions under alternative policies with universal, simultaneous 
participation, “Limited nuclear” and “EPPA-Ref gas prices” (GtCO2/year). 
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3.2.1 The Effect of CO2 Prices 
A global picture of coal use under these alternative CO2 price assumptions, assuming 
“Limited nuclear” capacity and EPPA-Ref gas prices, is shown in Table 5.  In the absence of 
climate policy, coal consumption grows from 100 EJ in 2000 to 448 EJ in 2050.  Under the “Low 
CO2 price” trajectory coal’s contribution to 2050 global emissions is lowered from 40 GtCO2 per 
year to around 17 GtCO2 per year while total coal consumption falls to 45% of its no-policy level 
(though 100% above its 2000 level). The contribution of carbon capture and storage (CCS) is 
relatively small in this case because at this price trajectory CCS technology does not become 
economic until around 2035 or 2040, leading to a small market penetration, 4% of coal use by 
2050. The picture differs substantially under the assumption of a “High CO2 price” pattern. The 
contribution of coal to 2050 CO2 emissions is projected to fall by 66% under the lower price 
path, yet coal use falls by only another 20% (and still remains 61% above the 2000 level).  The 
large reduction in emissions from coal coupled with a smaller reduction in consumption points to 
the adoption of CCS technologies as shown in the third line of the table. With higher CO2 price 
levels early in the simulation period CCS has time to take a larger market share and accounts for 
60% of coal consumption in 2050.  
Table 5. Implications for Global Coal Use of Alternative CO2 Prices.a 
BAU 
Indicator 
2000 2050 
Low CO2 
Price 
2050 
High CO2 
Price 
2050 
Coal Consumption (EJ/yr) 100 448 200 161 
Coal CO2 emissions (GtCO2/yr) 9 40 17 5 
% Coal Consumption by CCS  0% 0% 4% 60% 
% CO2 emissions from coal 38% 57% 38% 19% 
a. Universal, simultaneous participation, “Limited nuclear” and “EPPA-Ref gas prices”. 
The point to take from Table 5 is that CO2 mitigation policies at the level tested here will 
limit the expected growth of coal and associated emissions but not necessarily constrict the 
industry below today’s level. Also, the long-term future for coal use and the likely achievement 
in CO2 emissions abatement are sensitive to the development and public acceptance of CCS 
technology and the timely provisions of incentives for its commercial application. For cases of 
still greater emissions reduction by 2050 the prospects for coal are even more dependent on the 
pace of CCS development; for example see the effects of 50% to 70% reduction in the U.S. 
explored by Paltsev et al. (2007). 
Table 6 provides global and country-level coal consumption for all scenarios of CO2 prices, 
gas prices and nuclear expansion.  The countries listed include the top four coal using countries 
in 2050 (China, U.S., India, and Japan) and two aggregate regions, the Europe Union and the 
former Soviet Union.  These countries and regions account for at least 60% of global coal use in 
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2050 across all of the scenarios5. China and the U.S. accounted for over 50% of global 
consumption in 2000 at 28 EJ and 24 EJ respectively.  Europe, India, and the FSU each 
accounted for between 7 to 10 EJ of coal consumption while Japan consumes 3.6% of the total.  
Under the “Business-as-usual” case with “EPPA-Ref gas prices” and “Limited nuclear”, coal 
consumption in China rises by a factor of three to 88 EJ in 2050 while U.S. consumption grows 
by 140% to 58 EJ.  Consumption in India, the EU and FSU grows to between 30 and 40 EJ with 
the fastest growth occurring in India (460%).6  Japan’s consumption quadruples to 15 EJ over 
this time. 
Table 6. Coal use under different assumptions, universal simultaneous participation (EJ). 
Scenario Region BAU Low 
CO2 
Price 
High 
CO2 
Price 
Index 2050 to 2000 
Gas 
Price 
Nuclear  2000 2050 2050 2050 BAU Low High 
EPPA-
Ref 
Limited  Global 100 448 200 161 4.5 2.0 1.6 
  USA  24 58 42 40 2.4 1.8 1.7 
  China 28 88 37 39 3.1 1.3 1.4 
  India 7.3 41 25 22 5.6 3.4 3.0 
  Europe 10 36 17 5.8 3.6 1.7 0.6 
  FSU 7.1 30 4.8 7.1 4.2 0.7 1.0 
  Japan 3.6 15 12.2 5.1 4.2 3.4 1.4 
EPPA-
Ref 
Expanded  Global 99 405 158 121 4.1 1.6 1.2 
  USA 23 44 29 25 1.9 1.3 1.1 
  China 26 83 30 31 3.2 1.2 1.2 
  India 7.2 35 18 14 4.9 2.5 1.9 
  Europe 10 33 13 5.4 3.3 1.3 0.5 
  FSU 7.1 28 4.8 6.9 3.9 0.7 1.0 
  Japan 3.6 14 9.6 4.6 3.9 2.7 1.3 
Low Limited  Global 100 438 162 111 4.4 1.6 1.1 
  USA 24 53 12 14 2.2 0.5 0.6 
  China 27 84 15 39 3.1 0.6 1.4 
  India 7.3 39 4.7 2.1 5.3 0.6 0.3 
  Europe 10 36 29 5.9 3.6 2.9 0.6 
  FSU 7.1 30 7.2 17 4.2 1.0 2.4 
  Japan 3.6 14 11 5.0 3.9 3.1 1.4 
Low Expanded  Global 99 397 129 89 4 1.3 0.9 
  USA 24 41 14 17 1.7 0.6 0.7 
  China 26 80 13 31 3.1 0.5 1.2 
  India 7.2 32 2.4 1.2 4.4 0.3 0.2 
  Europe 10 33 26 5.6 3.3 2.6 0.6 
  FSU 7.0 28 5.9 7.8 4.0 0.8 1.1 
  Japan 3.6 14 7.8 4.4 3.9 2.2 1.2 
                                                 
5 The inclusion of the regions AFR, MES, LAM, ASI, and ROW, as defined in Table 1, would account for 90% of 
all coal consumption under all of the scenarios. 
6 In the no policy case, coal use in the remaining regions grows by nearly 800% from 21 EJ in 2000 to 180 EJ in 
2050.  In most of these regions this increase is attributable to coal use in the electric sector.  
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Similarly, there is strong regional variation the Table 5 results for the effects of carbon policy 
which can be seen in the top panel for “EPPA-Ref gas prices” and “Limited nuclear” scenario.  
Under “Low CO2 prices”, the coal consumption in the FSU exhibits the greatest decline, 84%, to 
5 EJ, as natural gas substitutes for coal in the electric power sector.  Europe undergoes a similar 
transformation in the electric power sector, but coal consumption declines by only 50% to 17 EJ.  
Under “High CO2 prices”, the FSU’s coal consumption falls by only 76% because the “High 
CO2 prices” stimulate earlier adoption of CCS technologies.  Conversely, the EU increases its 
reliance on natural gas to the detriment of coal-fired generation.  Coal consumption drops by 
84% to 6 EJ.   
Although China’s and India’s coal consumption grows faster than that of the U.S. without 
policy, a CO2 charge yields a greater percentage reduction in these countries than in the U.S.  By 
2050 the High CO2 prices have reduced Chinese use by 56% to 39 EJ and Indian use by 46% to 
22 EJ.  However, U.S. consumption is reduced by only 31% to 40 EJ. The main reason for the 
difference in response is the composition of coal consumption, and to a lesser extent a difference 
in the thermal efficiency of the electric power sectors, of these countries.  By 2050 in the 
reference scenario (“EPPA-Ref gas prices” and “Limited nuclear”) China and India consume 
48% and 27% of coal in non-electric power sectors compared with only 5% in the U.S.  Under 
the “High CO2 price” policy, China’s share of coal consumption in the other sectors declines to 
12% and India’s to 4% while U.S. share drops two percentage points.  Furthermore, within the 
electric sector, U.S. power plants are relatively more thermally efficient than in China and India 
so opportunities to lower coal consumption in China’s and India’s power sectors are greater.  The 
“Low CO2 price” policy has very similar effects in these three regions.  In percentage terms, 
Japan is the most sensitive to the different carbon price paths.  In the “Low CO2 price” case, 
consumption declines by 20% to 12 EJ.  The “High CO2 price” path causes a much greater 
substitution of natural gas for coal in the power sector as coal consumption declines to by 66% to 
5 EJ. 
3.2.2 The Effect of Expanded Nuclear  
The second panel of Table 6 displays the effect on the coal use of alternative assumptions 
about the expansion of nuclear power. Nuclear electricity growth at the level assumed in the 
“Expanded nuclear” case directly displaces electricity from coal. For example, under “Business-
as-usual” the provision of “Expanded nuclear” generation reduces 2050 global coal by 10% 
from 448 to 405 EJ.  The regional effects of expanded nuclear on coal use range from declines of 
24% and 15% in the U.S. and India respectively to 6-8% in the other listed regions.7   
The reduction in coal use is magnified by CO2 prices.  Under both the “Low CO2 price” and 
“High CO2 price” cases, “Expanded nuclear” scenario lowers global coal consumption by 
roughly 20% from the “Limited nuclear” case to 158 EJ and 121 EJ, respectively.  Consumption 
in the U.S. and India falls by approximately 30% to 29 EJ and 18 EJ with low CO2 prices and 
under 40% to 25 EJ and 14 EJ with high CO2 prices.  China’s coal consumption drops by 20% 
                                                 
7 The effect of expanded nuclear is similar under the low gas price case. 
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under both price paths to 30 EJ.  Similarly, nuclear expansion with low CO2 prices in the EU and 
Japan lowers coal use by roughly 20%, yet with high CO2 prices consumption drops by only 7-
10%.  At high CO2 prices, coal consumption is already very low in the EU and Japan, and 
nuclear primarily displaces electricity from natural gas. Coal consumption in the FSU is 
essentially unchanged by the expansion of nuclear power because nuclear substitutes for gas 
generation there.  
 
 
Figure 6. Electricity Production in 2050 Under Alternative Policies with Universal, 
Simultaneous Participation, “EPPA-Ref gas prices”, “Limited nuclear” and “Expanded 
nuclear” (EJ/year).  
Figure 6 provides more detail of the generation patterns underlying these results, showing 
the effect of the imposition of high CO2 prices and the effect of alternative patterns of nuclear 
expansion. Notable in the Figure 6 is the fact that conventional fossil generation (i.e. that existing 
in 2000) has been retired and only the new dispatchable technologies (plus hydro) remain. Also, 
high CO2 prices lead to the application of capture and storage in some regions but to replacement 
of coal by natural gas combined cycle generation in others, with the dominant use of CCS being 
in the U.S. and China. By 2050 coal CCS is beginning to grow in Europe and it does not enter in 
Japan until 2055.  Europe and Japan have two of the more energy efficient conventional power 
sectors.  Furthermore, both regions are large importers of this fuel in the base year which enables 
them to switch a greater share of their electricity production to natural gas.8  These factors make 
natural gas generation more competitive with coal CCS in these two than in other regions. 
                                                 
8 In part this result is a feature of the EPPA model structure, which is based on constant elasticity of substitution 
(CES) functions (Paltsev et al., 2005). The share-preserving tendency of this equation form enables gas growth 
(by imports) in these two regions while restraining it in other regions. 
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Natural gas dominates CCS in the FSU because of its large domestic gas resources.  
3.2.3 The Effect of Low Gas Prices 
The results of the “Low gas price” scenario, presented in Table 6, show more regional 
variability in terms of coal use because the price changes are greater in some regions than others, 
and the availability of low-cost gas has a positive effect on economic growth. In the “BAU” 
case, lower gas prices have a small negative effect upon global coal consumption.  Although coal 
competes with natural gas in the electric power sector, low natural gas prices have a stimulating 
effect on national economies.  Thus the substitution of coal for gas is mitigated by the 
countervailing increased demand for electricity and output from other coal using sectors.  In 
2050, global coal consumption declines by a mere 2% to 438 EJ.  The effect is greater in the U.S. 
and Japan as consumption declines by 9% and 7% as advanced gas generation displaces coal.  A 
5% decline is seen in both China and India.  Coal use in the EU and FSU is unchanged.  As 
described above, the “Low gas price” scenario treats gas as perfectly fungible commodity across 
regions much like today’s global oil market.  Although natural gas prices are lower in most 
regions, prices in the EU and FSU rise by 20% and 35% respectively as other regions compete 
for the cheap gas previously available in these two regions.  All other factors being equal, we 
would expect the higher gas prices to depress these economies and lower coal demand.  
However, the stimulating effect of lower gas prices in the other regions raises consumption in all 
regions, offsetting the negative impact of higher domestic gas prices in the EU and FSU.  Coal 
demand in these two regions is therefore unaffected. 
The effects of the “Low gas price” scenario on coal consumption under carbon prices are 
more complex. With “Low CO2 prices” global coal consumption falls by 19% to 162 EJ in 2050 
versus the scenario with “EPPA-Ref gas prices”.  However this statistic hides the dramatic 
differences across regions. China, the U.S., and India experience dramatic declines of 59%, 71%, 
and 81% respectively.  However, coal consumption in the EU and FSU is 71% and 50% higher 
due to the stimulating effect low gas prices have on growth in these economies.  Japan witnesses 
a small drop in coal consumption of 10%.  “High CO2 prices” in combination with “Low gas 
prices” reduce global coal consumption by 31% from 161 EJ (“High CO2 prices” and “EPPA-
Ref gas prices”) to 111 EJ.  In the U.S., China, and FSU the “High CO2 price” path leads to 
greater coal consumption than under the “Low CO2 prices”.  As explained in Section 3.3, this 
result is due to earlier adoption of CCS technologies in these regions.  “Low gas prices” and the 
high CO2 penalty reduce consumption in India by 90% to 2 EJ.  The lower gas prices and “High 
CO2 prices” lead to minor changes in consumption in the EU and Japan. 
3.2.4 The Combined Effect of Low Gas Prices and Expanded Nuclear 
The bottom panel of Table 6 depicts the greatest threat to the future of coal: “Expanded 
nuclear” with “Low gas prices”.  In the “BAU” case, global coal consumption declines from the 
reference case by 11% to just under 400 EJ.  Consumption in the U.S. and India declines by 29% 
and 22%, respectively.  China, the EU, FSU, and Japan reduce consumption by between 7% and 
9%.  These results are similar to those from the EPPA-Ref gas, Expanded nuclear case.  This 
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reinforces nuclear energy’s role as a direct substitute for coal in the absence of carbon prices. 
Global coal consumption grows very slowly under “Low CO2 prices”, from 100 EJ to 130 EJ 
over 50 years, or actually declines by 10 EJ from 2000 levels.  With “High CO2 prices”, coal use 
declines 78% compared to the “EPPA-Ref gas prices”, “Limited nuclear” case.  Regionally, 
“Low CO2 price” cases lower coal consumption by over 80% in China (13 EJ) and India (2.4 EJ) 
and over 75% in the U.S. (14 EJ) and FSU (6 EJ).  Europe and Japan are slightly less affected 
with respective reductions of 21% and 44% respectively.  The combined effects of “Low gas 
prices” and “Expanded nuclear” show the largest changes in India (96% reduction) and Europe 
(83% reduction).  These countries are followed by the FSU and Japan with 70% reductions to 8 
EJ and 4 EJ.  The U.S. and China have the lowest percent changes in consumption with 
reductions of 60% to 17 EJ and 31 EJ respectively.  The “Low gas prices” with in combination 
with “Expanded nuclear” actually stimulate economic activity in the U.S., raising coal 
consumption by roughly 20% compared to the “Low gas prices”, “Limited nuclear” scenario in 
the Low and High CO2 price cases to 14 EJ and 17 EJ respectively.  The U.S. is the only region 
in which higher nuclear output increases coal consumption.   
3.3 Effects on Coal Prices 
Accompanying these developments are changes in the price of coal, which the EPPA model 
treats as imperfectly substitutable among countries and thus available for use at somewhat 
different prices. Carbon prices and assumptions about natural gas prices and the growth of 
nuclear power affect these prices.  The EPPA simulations, as shown in Table 7 indicate that this 
expanding use of coal will involve coal prices at or slightly above today’s levels in the absence 
of CO2 prices.  Under “BAU” conditions, India exhibits the greatest change in coal prices with 
prices rising by 100%.  China experiences price increases of 65% to 70% followed by the U.S., 
Japan, and FSU at 40% to 50%.  Europe’s prices change by only 20%.  Assumptions regarding 
gas prices and nuclear growth have minimal effects without a carbon policy.  
With “Low CO2 prices”, assumptions about gas price and nuclear growth have significant 
effects on coal prices.  Instead of doubling, India’s coal price ranges from no change to a 40% 
increase.  China, the U.S., and Japan show 10% to 20% increases while the FSU and Europe 
show no change.  Under “High CO2 prices”, the price rise is tempered even further and can lead 
to price declines of 5 to 10% in the case of advanced nuclear and low gas prices.  India has the 
widest range of prices, from 5% decrease to a 35% increase.  Coal prices in the U.S. and China 
exhibit no change to a 15% increase.  Changes in Japan and the FSU span from no change to a 
10% increase.  Prices in Europe drop roughly 10% in all cases. 
4. THE CRUCIAL ROLE OF CAPTURE AND STORAGE 
A central conclusion to be drawn from our examination of alternative futures for coal is that, 
if carbon capture and storage is successfully adopted, coal utilization will likely expand even 
with stabilization of CO2 emissions. As shown below, extension of these emissions control 
scenarios farther into the future shows continuing growth in coal use provided CCS is available. 
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Also to be emphasized is the fact that market adjustment to CCS requires a significant and 
widely applied charge for CO2 emissions to incentivize adoption.  
 
Table 7. Coal price index in 2050 under alternative assumptions, universal simultaneous 
participation (year 2000  = 1.0). 
Scenario BAU Low CO2 Price High CO2 Price 
Gas Price Nuclear 
Region 
   
EPPA-Ref Limited USA  1.47 1.21 1.17 
  China 1.73 1.24 1.14 
  India 2.15 1.53 1.34 
  Europe 1.21 0.99 0.90 
    FSU 1.43 1.03 0.97 
    Japan 1.55 1.22 1.11 
EPPA-Ref Expanded USA 1.39 1.14 1.08 
  China 1.67 1.17 1.07 
  India 2.01 1.37 1.22 
  Europe 1.18 0.97 0.89 
    FSU 1.41 1.02 0.97 
    Japan 1.49 1.17 1.07 
Low Limited USA 1.44 1.09 1.01 
  China 1.71 1.15 1.07 
  India 2.08 1.12 0.97 
  Europe 1.20 1.02 0.88 
    FSU 1.42 1.05 1.07 
    Japan 1.53 1.18 1.04 
Low Expanded USA 1.38 1.07 1.03 
  China 1.64 1.08 1.01 
  India 1.92 1.04 0.95 
  Europe 1.18 1.00 0.88 
    FSU 1.40 1.02 0.96 
    Japan 1.48 1.13 1.02 
 
The extent of coal CCS adoption under all scenarios with “Low CO2 prices” and “High CO2 
prices” is presented in Table 8.  At “Low CO2 prices”, coal CCS provides only 2% of global 
electricity supply by 2050.  Of the regions examined here, China accounts for most of the coal 
CCS generation.  China adopts CCS technology earlier than most regions because 1) its fleet of 
existing plants is less efficient than plants in other regions, 2) electricity demand is growing 
rapidly, and 3) substitution to natural gas is more difficult because China has low domestic gas 
reserves and gas imports are small relative to other imports. Of the regions considered in this 
study, the U.S. has invested in a few plants at by 2050 as has the FSU under “Low gas prices”.  
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Table 8. Coal CCS Output, % Electricity from Coal, and % of Coal to CCS in 2050, universal 
simultaneous participation. 
Scenario 
  
Region 
Coal CCS Output (EJ)% Electricity from
Coal CCS 
% of Coal to CCS 
Gas Price Nuclear  Low Price High Price Low Price High PriceLow PriceHigh Price
EPPA-Ref Limited  Global 2.4 29.2 2% 26% 4% 60% 
  USA  0.1 9.4 0% 44% <1% 76% 
  China 1.8 11 16% 91% 16% 88% 
  India 0 1.8 0% 27% 0 33% 
  Europe 0 0.1 0% 1% 0 7% 
    FSU 0 0.9 0% 10% 0 48% 
    Japan 0 0 0% 0% 0 0 
EPPA-Ref Expanded Global 2.1 22.5 2% 19% 4% 62% 
  USA 0.1 6.6 0% 30% 1% 86% 
  China 1.6 8.4 14% 69% 18% 85% 
  India 0 1.5 0% 21% 0 44% 
  Europe 0 0.1 0% 1% 0 4% 
    FSU 0 0.9 0% 10% 0 47% 
    Japan 0 0 0% 0% 0 0 
Low Limited  Global 2.3 21.6 2% 19% 5% 65% 
  USA 0.1 1.9 0% 9% 2% 46% 
  China 1.7 11 14% 91% 38% 88% 
  India 0 0.3 0% 4% 0 50% 
  Europe 0 0.2 0% 1% 0 9% 
    FSU 0.1 3.6 1% 41% 7% 78% 
    Japan 0 0 0% 0% 0 0 
Low Expanded Global 2.1 14.2 2% 12% 5% 52% 
  USA 0.1 1.1 0% 5% 2% 22% 
  China 1.5 8.2 13% 67% 36% 85% 
  India 0 <0.1 0% 0% 0 12% 
  Europe 0 0.1 0% 1% 0 8% 
  FSU 0.1 1.1 1% 13% 8% 52% 
  Japan 0 0 0% 0% 0 0 
 
All of the regions, with the exception of Japan, adopt CCS under the “High CO2 price” 
scenarios as depicted in Figure 4.  Again, China is the largest adopter of CCS technologies with 
8 to 11 EJ per year of generation by 2050.  Coal CCS provides 67% to 91% of China’s electricity 
across the gas and nuclear scenarios.  With “EPPA-Ref gas prices”, the U.S. is the second largest 
adopter of coal CCS with 6.6 to 9.4 EJ per year of generation.  Coal CCS provides 30% to 44% 
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of its electricity.  India and the FSU, again under “EPPA-Ref gas prices”, are a distant third and 
fourth in generation at 1.5-1.8 EJ per year and 0.9 EJ per year, respectively.  Japan is slower to 
adopt coal CCS because of the high thermal efficiency of its conventional sector and the ease 
with which Japan can substitute natural gas for coal in the EPPA model (see footnote 8). 
With “Low gas prices”, CCS adoption in the FSU increases slightly to 1.1 EJ per year as the 
FSU exports more gas and relies more heavily on coal for its own generation.  U.S. coal CCS 
generation drops to 1-2 EJ per year as advanced gas technologies are favored over coal CCS.  
India follows a similar path.  Europe shows minimal adoption across all of the cases (0.1 to 0.2 
EJ per year).  Europe and Japan switch to natural gas generation prior to 2050 more readily than 
other regions because they currently import significant quantities of natural gas.   
The importance of CCS for this picture of future coal use is underlined by the projection of 
coal use if the same CO2 emission penalty is imposed and CCS is not available, as shown in 
Table 9.  This chart motivates our study’s emphasis on coal use with CCS.  The successful 
adoption of CCS is critical to future coal use in a carbon-constrained world. With “High CO2 
prices” and without CCS, global coal consumption rises to only 116 EJ by 2050, a reduction of 
nearly 30% from the same scenario with CCS.  Regionally, the FSU experiences the greatest 
decline of almost 50% relative to consumption.  Consumption in China and the U.S. declines by 
38% and 30%, respectively from the case with CCS.  Consumption remains at roughly year 2000 
levels in these regions.  India and Europe show only modest reductions in consumption of 5% 
and 7%. 
 
Table 9. Coal Use With and Without CCS, universal simultaneous participation, “EPPA-Ref 
gas prices” and “Limited nuclear” (EJ). 
BAU High CO2 Price in 2050 
Region 2000 2050 With CCS Without CCS % change 
Global 100 447 161 116 -28 
USA 24 58 40 28 -30 
China 28 88 39 24 -38 
India 7.3 41 22 21 -5 
Europe 10 36 5.8 5.4 -7 
FSU 7.1 30 7.1 3.7 -48 
Japan 3.6 15 5.1 5.1 0 
 
More significantly, considering the energy needs of developing countries, this technology 
may be an essential component of any attempt to stabilize global emissions of CO2, much less to 
meet the Climate Convention’s goal of stabilized atmospheric concentrations. This conclusion 
holds even for plausible levels of expansion of nuclear power and also most likely for policies 
stimulating the other approaches to emissions mitigation such as renewables, demand response, 
and efficiency gains. 
Note, however, that these simulation studies assume that CCS will be available, and proved 
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socially and environmentally acceptable, at such time as more widespread agreement may be 
reached on direct penalties on CO2 emissions. This technical option is not available in this sense 
today, of course. Many years of development and demonstration will be required to prepare for 
its successful, large scale adoption throughout the world. A rushed attempt at CCS 
implementation could lead to project failure, economic waste and, at worst, loss of this important 
option even when there is societal willingness to pay for it. Therefore these simulation studies 
further suggest that development work is called for now at a scale appropriate to the 
technological and societal challenge in the search for the most effective and efficient path 
forward. 
5. EXTENSION TO 2100 
The application of this analysis in Ansolabehere et al. (2007) explored only to 2050. In 
Table 10 we extend the simulations to 2100 for a subset of the cases above, to explore coal 
prospects over the longer term. Prices of CO2 are assumed to continue growth at the same rates 
as in Figure 4: 5% for the Low case leading to $669 per ton in 2100, and 4% for the High case 
which rises to $834 in 2100 (all still in 2005 dollars). In the “Expanded nuclear” case the 
contribution of this technology is assumed to rise by 3% per year in all regions from 2050 to 
2100, whereas in the Limited nuclear case it remains at roughly the 2050 level. Only the “EPPA-
Ref gas price” is explored in this extension to 2100 and in the U.S. it reaches around seven times 
the base year (2000) price by 2100 - up from 3.6 times in 2050. Under “BAU” conditions global 
CO2 emissions reach 92 GtCO2 per year with coal’s share of emissions rising slightly from 53% 
from 2050 to 55% in 2100.  
 
Table 10. Global coal use at alternative CO2 prices in 2050 and 2100, universal 
simultaneous participation, “EPPA-Ref gas prices” and “Limited nuclear”. 
BAU Low CO2 Price High CO2 
Price Indicator 
2000 2050 2100 2050 2100 2050 2100 
Coal Consumption (EJ/yr) 100 448 734 200 438 161 385 
Coal CO2 emissions 
(GtCO2/yr) 
9 40 51 17 1 5 0.9 
% Coal Consumption by 
CCS  
0% 0% 0% 4% 97% 60% 96% 
% CO2 emissions from coal 38% 57% 60% 38% 7% 19% 7% 
 
Under the “Low CO2 price” and “High CO2 price” scenarios and “Limited nuclear”, global 
CO2 emissions decline to 15 and 13 GtCO2 per year, respectively. Due to the widespread 
adoption of CCS technologies, emissions from coal are roughly a tenth of their year 2000 levels 
while consumption has grown four-fold. Coal emissions account for less than 10% of total CO2 
emissions. 
 20 
Table 11 shows regional coal use under “High CO2 prices” and “Low CO2 prices” as well as 
“Limited nuclear” and “Expanded nuclear”.  Coal consumption under the Low and High carbon 
prices is nearly the same for most regions with the exception of FSU and Japan. In the FSU, coal 
consumption by the coal CCS technology peaks in 2065 and gradually loses market share to gas 
CCS technology thereafter. In Japan, the “High CO2 price” scenario leads to earlier and faster 
adoption of coal CCS than in the “Low CO2 price” case. 
 
Table 11. Coal use in 2100, universal simultaneous participation and EPPA-Ref gas prices 
(EJ). 
BAU Low CO2 Price High 
CO2 
Price 
Index 2100 to 2000 
Nuclear 
Region 
2000 2100 2100 2100 BAU Low High 
Limited  Global 100 734 438 385 7.3 4.4 3.9 
 USA 24 106 66 64 4.4 2.8 2.7 
 China 28 110 55 53 3.9 2.0 1.9 
 India 7.3 67 43 44 9.2 5.9 6.0 
 Europe 10 50 39 39 5.0 3.9 3.9 
  FSU 7.1 48 32 22 6.8 4.5 3.1 
  Japan 3.6 21 11 16 5.8 3.1 4.4 
Expanded  Global 99 571 161 123 5.8 1.6 1.2 
 USA 23 75 0.5 0.6 3.3 0.0 0.0 
 China 26 101 17 15 3.9 0.7 0.6 
 India 7.2 46 7.6 6.8 6.4 1.1 0.9 
 Europe 10 13 4.3 4.9 1.3 0.4 0.5 
 FSU 7.1 38 15 9.2 5.4 2.1 1.3 
  Japan 3.6 7.5 1.5 1.3 2.1 0.4 0.4 
 
By 2100, the “Expanded nuclear” case paints a very different picture for coal. Global coal 
expansion is limited to between 120 to 160 EJ depending on the assumed CO2 price trajectory.  
Coal consumption in the U.S. declines to less than 1 EJ per year.  The only regions showing 
consumption at or above 2000 levels are India and the FSU.  Figure 7 shows the underlying 
electricity generation by technology that explains these consumption patterns. Naturally, all these 
results are dependent on the estimates of the relative cost per kW of nuclear and coal generation 
capacity with carbon capture. 
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Figure 7. Electricity Production in 2100 Under Alternative Policies with Universal, 
Simultaneous Participation, EPPA-Ref gas Prices, and Limited and Expanded nuclear 
(EJ/year). 
 
 
6. CONCLUSIONS 
Analysis of coal consumption under alternative assumptions about price penalties on CO2 
emissions shows that, even under greenhouse gas controls, the coal industry will likely be larger 
in 2050 than today if nuclear growth is restrained and natural gas prices follow the projection of 
our economic model. Provided, that is that CO2 capture and storage (CCS) is available. If CCS 
development is for some reason restrained then projected 2050 coal use is substantially reduced. 
Growth in nuclear power also reduces coal use in the period to 2050, though not necessarily 
below levels of today if CCS is applied. 
Looking farther in the future, coal would regain much of the early in-century growth lost to 
CO2 mitigation, again assuming nuclear growth is restrained and investment continues in CCS 
technology. Even with strong nuclear expansion, a CCS-enabled coal industry is projected to be 
larger in 2100 than today. 
The implementation of a dispatching algorithm that distinguishes peak, intermediate and base 
load dispatch leads to differences in results for these competing technologies and is viewed as an 
improvement in the capability of the EPPA model. Subsequent stages in enhancement of this 
analysis facility, for analysis of the electric sector, will involve the explicit representation of 
advanced nuclear power designs, for a more accurate modeling of the competition between coal 
with CCS and nuclear and advanced gas technology.   
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APPENDIX: COMPARISON OF ELECTRIC SECTOR MODELS 
This section examines the effects of separating electricity generation into peak, intermediate, 
and base loads, and tests the model’s sensitivity to the share of revenue provided by each load 
segment. More detailed modeling of electric dispatch allows us to focus more on specific 
technologies, but as peaking and intermediate loads require relatively more expensive and 
carbon-intensive generation, this disaggregation may also affect total CO2 emissions and cost of 
electricity. 
To examine the implications of the addition of the new dispatch procedure, and to test the 
sensitivity results to load shape, three cases are examined:  
• The standard EPPA (NoPIB),  
• EPPA with peak, intermediate, and base using respective revenue share of 3%, 14%, and 
83% (PIB), and  
• EPPA with higher peaking and intermediate demands (PIB High Peak, denoted PIB HP) 
constituting revenue shares of 10%, 30%, and 60%.9   
This third case would reflect a system with higher peak loads because of, for example, strong air 
conditioning load in summer months or perhaps less storage capability such as pumped hydro 
power which allows the use of base load energy to meet peak demands.   
The effects of these conditions on coal consumption, total CO2 emissions, CO2 emissions 
from coal, total electricity generated, electricity from coal with CCS, electricity prices, and coal 
prices are presented in Tables A1 - A7.  The cases are for “EPPA-Ref gas prices” and “Limited 
nuclear” as defined in Section 3 of the paper.  Both the absolute value and the percentage change 
from the standard model (NoPIB) in 2050 and 2100 are reported. The analysis focuses on the 
relative changes in results from the standard model.  As noted in the analysis above, the 2050 
results reflect a transition period for technologies, especially coal CCS.  Results for 2100 are 
reported to illustrate long-term equilibrium outcomes. The underlying assumptions for the 
extension to 2100 are those in Section 5.  For this analysis, we examine both “BAU” and “High 
CO2 price” scenarios. 
As shown by this sensitivity analysis, more detailed modeling of electric dispatch does not 
substantially affect global emissions profiles. Even under the most extreme case (10% of peaking 
and 30% of intermediate load), global CO2 emissions differ by only 7% from their reference 
emissions by 2100 (a difference that is far lower than reasonable uncertainty in the reference 
electric emissions). Estimated emissions and policy cost between these two dispatch models can 
vary more substantially by individual country or region, however. In these applications the same 
load profile is applied across all regions and all time periods. The variation in regional results in 
these experiments thus suggests the value of further research on electric demand in an effort 
tailor the load profile to the economic structure and behavior of individual regions and over time. 
                                                 
9 These revenue shares were estimated from the Pennsylvania-New Jersey-Maryland electric reliability area of North 
America based on 2005 locational marginal price data.  Peak revenue is calculated from the top 1200 hours in 
the year.  Intermediate revenue is determined from the next 5000 hours with base comprising the rest.  
 25 
 A1. Coal Consumption 
Under the “BAU” policy in 2050, the addition of the PIB structure lowers global coal 
consumption by 5% to 11%.  Regional changes range from +6% (China, India) to -20 to -40% 
(Europe, FSU, Japan). By 2100 the global effect is less pronounced with reductions of 2% to 6%.  
Regional changes range from +5% to -20%.  With load dispatch, electricity generally becomes 
more expensive than without because a greater amount of capital, and to a lesser extent, high 
value natural gas is used for peaking and intermediate generation.  This raises electricity prices 
(see Table A6a) and lowers total electricity consumption (see Table A4a). Regions with higher 
coal consumption (China, India, in 2050 and 2100 and in the U.S. in 2100) show shifts of coal 
consumption from the electric power sector to other sectors such as energy intensive industries. 
Under “High CO2 prices” in 2050, the addition of load dispatch leads to a modest 1% to 2% 
increase in global coal use, as shown in the far right columns of the table.  However, large 
regional differences exist.  Most of the regions examined experience declines of 7% to 51% 
while coal consumption increases in the U.S. and FSU by 14% to 23%.  Declines in most regions 
are explained by the same supply and demand story as in the “BAU” case.  The addition of load 
dispatching raises the price of electricity and carbon prices penalize coal generation more than 
other forms thus coal demand declines.   
The U.S. and FSU are anomalies to this.10 In the U.S., with load dispatch, the coal capture 
technology enters more rapidly.  Because a higher share of gas is required with load dispatch, the 
equilibrium price of electricity becomes high enough to make coal with CCS more economically 
attractive than in the NoPIB case.  In the FSU, without load dispatch, the advanced natural gas 
technology predominates electricity generation from 2050 through 2100.  The addition of load 
dispatch raises the equilibrium electricity price which lessens the difference between the natural 
gas technology and the coal capture technology and raises coal consumption by 23% to 80%.  By 
2100 all regions except the FSU show declines in coal consumption of 0% to 35% owing to the 
higher prices brought on by load dispatch. 
                                                 
10 Japan and India also show interesting behavior.  In Japan in 2050, the PIB case increases coal consumption by 
18% while the PIB-HP case reduces coal consumption by 27%.  The switch from noPIB to PIB increases coal 
consumption by making the advanced coal technology without capture more competitive with gas.  However, in 
the PIB-HP case, higher electricity prices allow the coal capture technology to compete more favorably with 
advanced natural gas.  The slower penetration rate of this technology reduces coal consumption.  A similar story 
holds for India although the change in coal consumption is smaller. 
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Table A1. Coal consumption under different dispatch models (EJ).* 
A1a. Results to 2050. 
% Change from NoPIB 
BAU High CO2 Price 
BAU 
High CO2 
Price 
PIB 
No 
PIB PIB 
PIB 
HP 
No 
PIB PIB 
PIB 
HP PIB 
PIB 
HP PIB 
PIB 
HP Region 
2000 2050 2050 2050 2050 2050 2050 2050 2050 2050 2050 
 Global 100 470 448 418 158 161 159 -5% -11% 2% 1% 
USA 23.6 63.9 58.4 54.1 39.6 40.3 45.3 -9% -15% 2% 14% 
China 26.5 86.9 87.9 91.1 42.0 39.3 37.1 1% 5% -6% -12% 
India 7.3 42.1 41.0 44.8 21.3 22.1 19.8 -3% 6% 4% -7% 
Europe 10.4 38.9 36.0 30.9 6.0 5.8 2.9 -7% -21% -4% -51% 
FSU 7.1 33.2 29.9 22.8 5.8 7.1 7.1 -10% -31% 23% 23% 
Japan 3.6 16.2 15.0 9.1 4.3 5.1 3.1 -8% -44% 18% -27% 
* Universal, simultaneous participation, “Limited nuclear” and “EPPA-Ref gas prices”. 
 
A1b. Results to 2100. 
% Change from NoPIB 
BAU High CO2 Price BAU High CO2 Price 
PIB 
No 
PIB PIB 
PIB 
HP 
No 
PIB PIB 
PIB 
HP PIB 
PIB 
HP PIB 
PIB 
HP Region 
2000 2100 2100 2100 2100 2100 2100 2100 2100 2100 2100 
 Global 100 752 734 707 410 385 337 -2% -6% -6% -18% 
USA 23.6 105 106 107 70.9 64.5 56.7 1% 1% -9% -20% 
China 26.5 108 110 114 60.5 53.4 39.6 2% 5% -12% -35% 
India 7.3 68.8 67.3 67.9 48.5 43.6 36.3 -2% -1% -10% -25% 
Europe 10.4 51.2 50.3 41.4 39.0 39.1 30.4 -2% -19% 0% -22% 
FSU 7.1 53.6 47.7 45.7 18.0 22.3 32.1 -11% -15% 24% 79% 
Japan 3.6 22.8 21.1 18.3 18.5 16.3 13.6 -8% -20% -12% -26% 
* Universal, simultaneous participation, “Limited nuclear” and “EPPA-Ref gas prices”. 
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A2. CO2 Emissions 
Global annual carbon dioxide emissions with PIB and PIB-HP under a “BAU” policy in 
2050 are 3% to 7% lower than the NoPIB case as presented in Table A2a.  Regional reductions 
range from 1% (China) to 15% (FSU, Japan).  The results are similar globally and regionally out 
to 2100.  The electricity price is higher with load dispatch because of the higher share of natural 
gas in the generating technology bundle.  This leads to a substitution away from electricity and a 
reduction in CO2 emissions. 
With “High CO2 prices”, the incorporation of load dispatch reduces global emission in 2050 
by 4% to 8%.  Regionally, the reductions range from 0% to 27% depending on the extent of CCS 
adoption.  China’s emissions rise by 5% in the PIB-HP case because the share of coal use in non-
electric sectors rises from 11% in the NoPIB case to 22% in the PIB-HP case. 
However, by 2100 annual emissions are 2% to 8% higher globally and 1% to 15% higher on 
a regional basis.  Although higher electricity prices with PIB and PIB-HP allow earlier entry of 
CCS technologies before 2050, the higher long-run electricity prices lowers the share of CCS 
generation, and thus raise emissions.   
 
Table A2. CO2 emissions under different dispatch models (GtCO2).∗ 
A2a. Results to 2050. 
% Change from No PIB 
BAU High CO2 Price BAU High CO2 Price 
PIB 
No 
PIB PIB 
PIB 
HP NoPIB PIB 
PIB 
HP PIB 
PIB 
HP PIB 
PIB 
HP 
Region 
2000 2050 2050 2050 2050 2050 2050 2050 2050 2050 2050 
 Global 23.8 72.5 70.3 67.3 29.9 28.8 27.4 -3% -7% -4% -8% 
USA 6.0 12.5 12.0 11.7 6.5 6.1 5.4 -4% -6% -6% -17% 
China 3.1 9.9 9.7 9.5 1.8 1.8 1.9 -1% -4% 0% 5% 
India 1.0 4.3 4.0 4.1 1.9 1.7 1.4 -6% -3% -11% -27% 
Europe 3.6 7.8 7.6 7.2 4.1 3.8 3.8 -3% -8% -7% -7% 
FSU 2.1 5.4 5.2 4.7 2.4 2.3 2.3 -4% -13% -2% -3% 
Japan 1.2 2.9 2.8 2.5 1.8 1.8 1.7 -3% -15% -1% -6% 
* Universal, simultaneous participation, “EPPA-Ref gas prices” and “Limited nuclear”. 
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A2b. Results to 2100. 
% Change from No PIB 
BAU High CO2 Price BAU 
High CO2 
Price 
PIB 
No 
PIB PIB 
PIB 
HP 
No 
PIB PIB 
PIB 
HP PIB PIB HP PIB 
PIB 
HP 
 
2000 2100 2100 2100 2100 2100 2100 2100 2100 2100 2100 
 
Global 23.8 106 103 98.9 12.6 13.0 13.7 -3% -7% 2% 8% 
USA 6.0 17.9 17.8 17.6 2.7 2.8 2.9 -1% -1% 1% 5% 
China 3.1 11.0 10.9 10.5 1.1 1.1 1.2 -1% -5% 5% 13% 
India 1.0 6.9 6.5 6.0 0.7 0.7 0.8 -6% -13% 1% 15% 
Europe 3.6 10.2 10.0 9.4 2.0 2.0 2.1 -2% -8% 1% 5% 
FSU 2.1 9.1 8.7 8.4 0.9 1.0 1.0 -5% -7% 3% 9% 
Japan 1.2 4.1 4.0 3.7 0.6 0.6 0.7 -3% -8% 3% 10% 
* Universal, simultaneous participation, “EPPA-Ref gas prices” and “Limited nuclear”. 
 
A3. CO2 Emissions from Coal 
CO2 emissions from coal are lower across the board under the PIB and PIB-HP cases as 
compared to the NoPIB case (Table A3).  The higher price of electricity causes a substitution 
away from electricity and therefore coal.  Globally, CO2 emissions from coal are lowered by 5 to 
15% in the “BAU” case for 2050 and 2100.   
With load dispatch, the High CO2 price case exhibits dramatic reductions in coal emissions in 
2050.  Global coal emissions are reduced by 16% to 35% with regional reductions of up to 85% 
(USA) relative to the NoPIB case.  By 2100, the global reduction is 4% to 5% with regional 
reductions of up to 28% (USA).  India exhibits a 100% increase in emissions from coal in 2100 
under the PIB-HP case.  The absolute emissions from coal are quite low.  The percentage change 
is high because India switches to the coal capture technology for intermediate load in this 
scenario. 
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Table A3. Coal emissions under different dispatch models (GtCO2).∗ 
A3a. Results to 2050. 
% Change from No PIB 
BAU High CO2 Price BAU 
High CO2 
Price 
PIB 
No 
PIB PIB 
PIB 
HP 
No 
PIB PIB 
PIB 
HP PIB 
PIB 
HP PIB 
PIB 
HP 
Region 
2000 2050 2050 2050 2050 2050 2050 2050 2050 2050 2050 
Global 9.0 42.4 39.9 36.1 6.4 5.4 4.2 -6% -15% -16% -35% 
USA 2.1 5.8 5.3 4.9 1.3 1.0 0.2 -9% -15% -28% -85% 
China 2.4 7.9 7.7 7.3 0.5 0.5 0.5 -3% -7% -5% -3% 
India 0.7 3.8 3.5 3.6 1.5 1.2 0.9 -7% -5% -14% -35% 
Europe 0.9 3.5 3.3 2.8 0.5 0.2 0.2 -7% -21% -69% -69% 
FSU 0.6 3.0 2.7 2.1 0.3 0.3 0.2 -10% -31% -1% -1% 
Japan 9.0 42.4 39.9 36.1 6.4 5.4 4.2 -6% -15% -16% -35% 
* Universal, simultaneous participation, “EPPA-Ref gas prices” and “Limited nuclear”. 
 
 
 
A3b. Results to 2100. 
% Change from No PIB 
BAU High CO2 Price BAU High CO2 Price 
PIB 
No 
PIB PIB 
PIB 
HP 
No 
PIB PIB 
PIB 
HP PIB 
PIB 
HP PIB 
PIB 
HP 
Region 
2000 2100 2100 2100 2100 2100 2100 2100 2100 2100 2100 
Global 9.0 64.9 61.8 56.7 0.91 0.86 0.87 -5% -13% -5% -4% 
USA 2.1 8.3 8.1 7.8 0.07 0.06 0.05 -2% -6% -12% -28% 
China 2.4 9.4 9.2 8.6 0.13 0.12 0.11 -2% -9% -6% -15% 
India 0.7 5.8 5.3 4.8 0.05 0.05 0.10 -8% -18% -12% 100% 
Europe 0.9 4.6 4.6 3.7 0.08 0.07 0.07 -2% -19% -7% -15% 
FSU 0.6 4.9 4.3 4.1 0.12 0.12 0.12 -11% -15% -1% -1% 
Japan 0.3 2.1 1.9 1.7 0.03 0.03 0.03 -8% -20% -5% -11% 
* Universal, simultaneous participation, “EPPA-Ref gas prices” and “Limited nuclear”. 
 
 
 30 
A4. Electricity Generation 
Global electricity generation is lower with load dispatch under the “BAU” case in 2050 and 
2100 by 3% to 9% with regional reductions of up to 15%.  Under the “High CO2 price” case, 
global generation falls between 2% and 4% in 2050 and 4% and 13% in 2100.  Regional 
reductions are the greatest in China and India at 22% in 2100.  The reduction in electricity 
demand is consistent with the higher electricity prices in the PIB and PIB-HP cases (see Table 
A6).   
The USA, however, shows a slight increase in generation in 2050 under the “High CO2 
price”, PIB-HP case.  As stated earlier, high electricity prices in the USA allow the coal CCS 
technology to enter the market earlier and expand more rapidly.  This leads to lower electricity 
prices and higher consumption from 2040 to 2050 in the US. 
 
Table A4. Electricity generation under different dispatch models (EJ).∗ 
A4a. Results to 2050. 
% Change from No PIB 
BAU High CO2 Price BAU 
High CO2 
Price 
PIB 
No 
PIB PIB 
PIB 
HP 
No 
PIB PIB 
PIB 
HP PIB 
PIB 
HP PIB 
PIB 
HP 
Region 
2000 2050 2050 2050 2050 2050 2050 2050 2050 2050 2050 
Global 45.5 150 145 137 116 114 111 -3% -9% -2% -4% 
USA 12.3 27.4 26.5 25.2 21.6 21.5 22.1 -3% -8% 0% 2% 
China 3.7 16.6 15.9 14.8 12.5 12.1 11.1 -4% -11% -3% -11% 
India 1.6 10.3 9.7 8.9 6.7 6.6 6.2 -6% -14% -3% -9% 
Europe 8.5 18.5 18.0 17.2 15.0 14.8 14.5 -3% -7% -2% -3% 
FSU 3.3 10.8 10.6 10.1 9.1 9.0 8.8 -2% -6% -1% -3% 
Japan 3.3 7.5 7.2 7.0 6.5 6.4 6.3 -3% -6% -2% -4% 
* Universal, simultaneous participation, “EPPA-Ref gas prices” and “Limited nuclear”. 
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A4b. Results to 2100. 
% Change from No PIB 
BAU High CO2 Price BAU 
High CO2 
Price 
PIB 
No 
PIB PIB 
PIB 
HP 
No 
PIB PIB 
PIB 
HP PIB 
PIB 
HP PIB 
PIB 
HP 
Region 
2000 2100 2100 2100 2100 2100 2100 2100 2100 2100 2100 
Global 45.5 229 223 210 171 164 149 -3% -8% -4% -13% 
USA 12.3 33.2 32.3 30.6 26.9 25.8 23.5 -3% -8% -4% -12% 
China 3.7 26.0 25.1 23.3 18.7 17.4 14.5 -4% -10% -7% -22% 
India 1.6 17.6 16.6 15.0 13.0 11.9 10.1 -6% -15% -8% -22% 
Europe 8.5 24.1 23.4 22.2 18.4 17.9 17.0 -3% -8% -3% -7% 
FSU 3.3 16.8 16.4 15.5 12.9 12.4 11.3 -3% -8% -4% -12% 
Japan 3.3 10.3 10.0 9.6 8.0 7.8 7.5 -2% -6% -2% -6% 
* Universal, simultaneous participation, “EPPA-Ref gas prices” and “Limited nuclear”. 
 
 
A5. Coal CCS Generation 
In 2050 under a “High CO2 price” case, the total coal CCS generation tends to be higher with 
PIB or PIB-HP than in the standard version (Table A5).  This is because higher electricity prices 
cause the CCS technology to enter earlier and significantly faster in most regions.  The level of 
coal CCS generation expands globally by 9% to 20% with regional changes of 9% to 112%.  
Coal CCS is still gaining market share globally and in the U.S. in 2050.  However, in China, the 
coal CCS technology becomes economically competitive in 2015 under NoPIB, PIB and PIB-
HP.  By 2050 it has saturated China’s electricity market.  Since PIB and PIB-HP lead to higher 
prices and greater gas consumption, the CCS coal share declines. 
In 2100 with “High CO2 prices”, total coal CCS generation falls by 7 to 19% with regional 
reductions of up to 32%.  The incorporation of load dispatch into the model raises the price of 
electricity and lowers overall electricity demand and therefore generation from coal CCS plants.  
The FSU is an exception to this.  The incorporation of load dispatch raises the price of natural 
gas causing the FSU to switch from advanced gas generation with capture to coal capture. 
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Table A5. Coal CCS Generation under “High CO2 Prices” in 2050 (EJ).∗ 
A5a. Results to 2050. 
Coal CCS generation 
(EJ) 
Share of Electricity 
from Coal CCS 
% Change from 
NoPIB Region 
No PIB PIB PIB HP No PIB PIB PIB HP PIB PIB HP 
Global 26.7 29.2 32.0 23% 26% 29% 9% 20% 
USA 7.8 9.4 12.7 36% 44% 58% 20% 63% 
China 11.8 11.0 9.4 95% 91% 84% -7% -21% 
India 1.3 1.8 2.1 19% 27% 34% 39% 63% 
Europe 0.06 0.11 0.12 0% 1% 1% 96% 112% 
FSU 0.55 0.93 0.93 6% 10% 11% 69% 70% 
Japan 26.7 29.2 32.0 23% 26% 29% 9% 20% 
* Universal, simultaneous participation, “EPPA-Ref gas prices” and “Limited nuclear”. 
 
A5b. Results to 2100. 
Coal CCS generation 
(EJ) 
Share of Electricity 
from Coal CCS 
% Change from 
NoPIB Region 
No PIB PIB PIB HP No PIB PIB PIB HP PIB PIB HP 
Global 110 103 89.6 64% 63% 60% -7% -19% 
USA 21.6 19.8 16.2 80% 77% 69% -8% -25% 
China 17.2 15.4 11.6 92% 89% 80% -10% -32% 
India 12.3 10.9 8.4 95% 91% 83% -12% -32% 
Europe 10.7 9.8 8.2 59% 55% 48% -8% -23% 
FSU 4.3 5.6 8.2 33% 45% 72% 30% 91% 
Japan 5.0 4.2 3.6 62% 54% 47% -15% -28% 
* Universal, simultaneous participation, “EPPA-Ref gas prices” and “Limited nuclear”. 
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 A6. Electricity Prices 
As previously mentioned, the addition of load dispatch to the model uniformly raises 
electricity prices in all regions in 2050 and 2100 by 3% to 24%.  With “High CO2 prices”, load 
dispatch raises electricity prices by 1% to 22% in 2050 and by 4% to 51% in 2100.  Electricity 
price in the USA in 2050 presents the sole exception as it declines by 5%.  The electricity prices 
generated in the USA prior to 2050 leads to a rapid adoption of CCS technology.  Electricity 
prices rise rapidly, peaking prior to 2050, then fall around 2050 and recover before 2100. 
 
Table A6. Electricity price indices under different dispatch models in 2050 and 2100.∗ 
A6a. Results to 2050. 
% Change from No PIB 
BAU High CO2 Price BAU 
High CO2 
Price 
PIB 
No 
PIB PIB 
PIB 
HP 
No 
PIB PIB 
PIB 
HP PIB 
PIB 
HP PIB 
PIB 
HP 
Region 
2000 2050 2050 2050 2050 2050 2050 2050 2050 2050 2050 
USA 1.0 1.46 1.54 1.68 2.18 2.18 2.06 5% 15% 0% -5% 
China 1.0 1.28 1.38 1.56 1.81 1.92 2.20 8% 21% 6% 22% 
India 1.0 1.12 1.22 1.39 2.03 2.06 2.18 9% 24% 1% 7% 
Europe 1.0 1.43 1.50 1.62 1.94 2.00 2.07 5% 14% 3% 6% 
FSU 1.0 1.09 1.12 1.20 1.54 1.55 1.61 3% 11% 1% 5% 
Japan 1.0 1.43 1.50 1.60 1.76 1.82 1.89 5% 12% 3% 7% 
* Universal, simultaneous participation, “EPPA-Ref gas prices” and “Limited nuclear”. 
 
A6b. Results to 2100. 
% Change from No PIB 
BAU High CO2 Price BAU 
High CO2 
Price 
PIB 
No 
PIB PIB 
PIB 
HP 
No 
PIB PIB 
PIB 
HP PIB 
PIB 
HP PIB 
PIB 
HP 
Region 
2000 2100 2100 2100 2100 2100 2100 2100 2100 2100 2100 
USA 1.0 1.59 1.66 1.80 1.82 1.95 2.26 4% 13% 7% 24% 
China 1.0 1.42 1.50 1.68 1.81 2.03 2.74 6% 18% 12% 51% 
India 1.0 1.37 1.48 1.67 1.59 1.77 2.26 7% 21% 11% 42% 
Europe 1.0 1.43 1.50 1.62 1.67 1.75 1.91 5% 13% 5% 15% 
FSU 1.0 1.20 1.24 1.35 1.19 1.28 1.50 4% 12% 8% 26% 
Japan 1.0 1.43 1.48 1.57 1.64 1.72 1.84 3% 10% 4% 12% 
* Universal, simultaneous participation, “EPPA-Ref gas prices” and “Limited nuclear”. 
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A7. Coal Prices 
Under “BAU” conditions in 2050, load dispatch has a moderate effect on coal prices.  Across 
all of the regions examined the PIB and PIB-HP change coal price by +1% (India) to -9%.  In 
2100, coal prices fall by 4% to 9%.   
The prices changes under the “High CO2 price” case are much smaller in 2050 with a range 
of +2% (FSU) to -3%.   By 2100, the coal prices have fallen by 2% to 14% (China and India), 
with a slight increase in the FSU. 
 
Table A7. Coal price indices under different dispatch models in 2050 and 2100.∗ 
A7a. Results to 2050. 
% Change from No PIB 
BAU High CO2 Price BAU 
High CO2 
Price 
PIB 
No 
PIB PIB 
PIB 
HP 
No 
PIB PIB 
PIB 
HP PIB 
PIB 
HP PIB 
PIB 
HP 
Region 
2000 2050 2050 2050 2050 2050 2050 2050 2050 2050 2050 
USA 1.00 1.50 1.47 1.42 1.16 1.17 1.16 -2% -6% 0% 0% 
China 1.00 1.76 1.73 1.70 1.15 1.14 1.12 -2% -3% -1% -3% 
India 1.00 2.20 2.15 2.23 1.34 1.34 1.33 -2% 1% -1% -1% 
Europe 1.00 1.23 1.21 1.17 0.92 0.90 0.90 -2% -4% -2% -2% 
FSU 1.00 1.48 1.43 1.35 0.95 0.97 0.98 -3% -9% 2% 2% 
Japan 1.00 1.58 1.55 1.50 1.11 1.11 1.10 -2% -5% 0% 0% 
* Universal, simultaneous participation, “EPPA-Ref gas prices” and “Limited nuclear”. 
 
A7b. Results to 2100. 
% Change from No PIB 
BAU High CO2 Price BAU 
High CO2 
Price 
PIB 
No 
PIB PIB 
PIB 
HP 
No 
PIB PIB 
PIB 
HP PIB 
PIB 
HP PIB 
PIB 
HP 
Region 
2000 2100 2100 2100 2100 2100 2100 2100 2100 2100 2100 
USA 1.00 2.60 2.50 2.4 1.46 1.41 1.31 -4% -8% -4% -10% 
China 1.00 4.47 4.28 4.2 1.73 1.64 1.50 -4% -7% -5% -13% 
India 1.00 5.21 4.99 4.8 2.38 2.22 2.05 -4% -7% -7% -14% 
Europe 1.00 1.69 1.63 1.6 1.02 1.00 0.97 -3% -8% -2% -5% 
FSU 1.00 2.11 2.01 1.9 1.22 1.21 1.24 -5% -9% 0% 2% 
Japan 1.00 2.78 2.65 2.5 1.41 1.36 1.29 -5% -9% -3% -8% 
* Universal, simultaneous participation, “EPPA-Ref gas prices” and “Limited nuclear”. 
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